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Corporate board for innovative managerial control: implications of 
corporate governance deviance perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
The recent wave of the global financial crisis has attracted attention on the governance 
practices of U.S. firms among academicians and regulators to study innovative 
governance mechanisms (Filatotchev, et al., 2020; Joseph, et al. 2014). The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform in 2010 is a direct response to the 2008 Global Financial crisis 
during the Obama administration, which presented several provisions to bring financial 
stability among U.S. firms. In the United States of America, as of February 2010, 
companies are mandated by the Security and Exchange Commission to present the 
reason and disclosure about their firm structure (Carlsson, 2003). The subsequent market 
crashes, for example, the U.S. stock market crash in 1929, 1987, 2008, and lately 
COVID-19 pandemic and a decade of economic depression have created an environment 
of mistrust between the holders of the capital, and the managers of the money (Harjoto, 
and Wang, 2020). Such a business environment has resulted in agency conflicts which 
require innovative governance mechanisms (Aguilera et al., 2019). Notwithstanding, the 
20th century has witnessed a burst of legislation (Saleem et al., in press), court cases, and 
shareholder reform movements (Lombardi et al., 2019). Central banks around the world 
have tried to prevent shareholder rights with an emphasis to instil the pioneering and at 
the same time standardised governance mechanisms and managerial controls (Saleem et 
al., in press).  
Governance literature has seen a plethora of research on the effectiveness of the 
corporate board as a control mechanism. For instance, Daily et al. (2003) explain 
corporate governance as a mechanism whose objectives are driven toward maximising 
the profitability of the shareholders and investor through minimising the cost associated 
with the deployment of the resources by hiring professional corporate board and 
adopting for standardised governance practices. Gompers et al. (2003) explained that 
effective management control though corporate board could lead to an increase in 
shareholder wealth. From the lens of agency theory Aguilera, et al. (2019) further 
explain the necessity of corporate board and innovative governance practices as a 
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control mechanism for Multinational Companies (MNCs). Filatotchev et al. (2020) 
explore the impact of recent technological changes and conclude that such changes could 
improve corporate control mechanisms by promoting a transition from strategic to 
financial controls within the existing governance framework.                
While firms are expected to comply with the national institutional governance 
framework, but lately, Aguilera et al. (2018) propose that the firms often over or under-
conforming governance practices, thus creating a deviate from industrial norms to reflect 
organisational identity. Based on the ecological perspective, the organisations also 
choose to deviate from standard governance practices to demonstrate risk-taking 
behaviour by exercising the agentic behaviour by challenging legal bindings and 
managerial control to achieve firm's vision (Filatotchev, et al., 2020). However, to 
understand the net impact of deviant behaviour still required attention, which is one of 
the primary objectives of this study (Aguilera et al., 2018).  So, this study embarks upon 
the firm's motivation behind the adoption, customisation and deviation of corporate 
governance practices that differ from the standardised governance control mechanisms 
(Filatotchev, et al., 2020). Drawing from the firm's entrepreneurial identity and ecology 
perspectives, the study explains why the firms deviate from standard corporate 
governance practices and apply innovative management control.  
This paper has five sections. The first section discusses the research gaps and significance to 
study deviance and innovation in the governance structure and mechanisms. In the second 
section literature review and hypotheses are developed. In the third section, the research 
design and methodology are discussed. Section four presents the main results, and the final 
section is dedicated to discussion and conclusion.  
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The conceptual studies have unveiled the role of corporate governance about the 
entrepreneurial orientation of the corporate board, and subsequent impact of 
entrepreneurial board structure on the innovation as a key performance indicator 
(Aguilera et al., 2019; Miller and Le Breton–Miller, 2011; Sheikh, and Wang, 2012). 
While classically, corporate governance is considered as a process which is affected by 
regulatory and legislative mechanisms as an external factor (Saleem et al., in press) but 
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the governance deviance behaviour of the firms is itself a unique process to achieve 
competitive advantage. According to literature, the governance deviance decision-
making approach happens in three stages (Joseph, et al. 2014; Aguilera et al., 2019 and 
2018). In the first stage, firms become aware of alternative governance approaches. 
Firms move toward a stage where deviance becomes more accessible in the second 
stage. The final stage involves an activation stage where the deviance practice falls 
outside the legitimate practices specified by the prevailing governance logic.  It requires 
the efforts of various stakeholders to ensure the implementation of effective internal 
control to protect the interest of the shareholders by introducing pioneering governance 
reforms. Nevertheless, being entrepreneurial with governance structure can make the 
firm innovative to ensure sustainable performance (Aguilera et al., 2018). But, the 
concept of entrepreneurial orientation (E.O.) has been underexplored at corporate 
board's level and its relevance can be found in line with the strategic decision making 
through the lens of social and organisational identity theory at the individual level. 
However, at the firm-level, E.O. can be characterized as the quest for market excellence 
through the investment in innovative governance structures and managerial controls, 
despite the high level of risk associated with it (Miller and Le Breton–Miller, 2011). 
Geng et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence in the context of Japan and conclude that 
centralized E.O. leads to the adoption of a shareholder-oriented which is why firm could 
deviate from the shareholder-orientation and agency perspective.    
Corporate governance is also concerned with the resolution of the state of conflict that 
born in a corporate setting between principal and manager of the firms (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Agency theory identifies that the agent and principal have divergent objectives, 
and it is difficult for the principal to monitor or control actions of the agent. Ross (1973) 
proposed agency problem occurs when different decision-makers are faced with the 
uncertainty considering that both agent and principal are independent states in the 
matter. Freitas et al. (2013) explain the complexities of choosing an appropriate 
governance model and propose an industry-specific governance mode to mitigate agency 
conflict by revalidating the work of Hamil et al. (2010). Badu and Appiah (2017) 
provide a comprehensive discussion on the importance of the board as a management 
control mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts. However, according to the ecology 
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theory, organizations evolve to survive, and an innovative governance mechanism is a 
need of time (Aguilera et al., 2018) to live in the competitive global business 
environment (Filatotchev, et al., 2020). The top-down transformation in the governance 
structure is usually possible by adopting for deviant governance structures. For instance, 
a corporate board can effectively reduce moral hazards and improve risk aversion with 
experienced and independent members (Badu and Appiah, 2017). Ferry and Ahrens 
(2017) enlightened us about the importance of the control function of the board for 
public sector firms and reaffirms the role of accountability relationships among key 
stakeholders that enables corporate governance as an effective management control tools 
to aid public interest. Similarly, Visser (2016) proposed an innovative management 
control framework for the public sector organizations that emphasize the need for a 
hierarchical, instead of the current departmental pyramid structure for better managerial 
control. So we can say that governance is a complex phenomenon, and "a one size fits 
all" approach may not be appropriate to resolve various types of agency conflict across 
diverse industries (Aguilera, et al., 2018). For example, Cox and Nguyen (2018) talked 
about the corporate's identity as the source of competitive advantages that differentiate 
the firm from other organisations and create a distinct value for shareholders. Cummings 
et al. (2019) found that firm who have the dual-class shares - in which there is a 
separation of ownership and voting rights - have been observed to experience negative 
probability of successful offering of company shares. Moreover, Firms with inherent 
good governance practices would provide higher protection rights to shareholders. It 
would force top management team to look for a higher pay-out payment option for the 
shareholders from whence the excess cash generated (Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar, 2010). 
One of innovative governance practice can be CEO duality. Although, Duru et al. (2016) 
found that even the CEO-duality harms the firm's performance, vigilance mitigates the 
effects that the board of directors provides to the firm. So, a firm that goes beyond the 
normative expectation in ensuring the equitable treatment of their shareholders would 
experience profound access to capital resources because the investor should be confident 
in mechanism in which that can safeguard their value (Harjoto and Wang, 2020).  
Whilst we have presented a few pieces of evidence from the literature about the impact 
of innovative and classical governance mechanisms on firm performance (Sheikh and 
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Wang, 2012), Foley et al. (2018) unveiled that 80 per cent of cross-listed firms in the 
United States chose to opt-out in at least one governance rule prescribed by the 
Securities and exchange commission; thus most of the firms just fill the documents and 
keep stick with the innovative governance practices to stay ahead of the market (Harjoto, 
and Wang, 2020; Sajjad, et al., 2018). In a similar vein, scholars tested the level of 
corporate governance compliance among Malaysian firms, to understand the governance 
compliance in emerging economies (Liew, 2007). They found that firms deviate in the 
adoption of several governance rules prescribed by the Securities to demonstrate an 
innovative governance structure which is stakeholder-driven. Such statistics provide 
more validity on the relevance of the cost-benefit analysis for the adoption of a 
prescribed governance model among corporations (Foley et al., 2018; Sajjad, et al., 
2018). Lately, Aguilera et al. (2018) also theorised the reasons for firms to adopt 
governance practices that do not conform to the dominant governance logic. Drawing on 
the theorisation of Garg (2013) and findings Joseph et al. (2014), Aguilera et al. (2018, 
2019) defined corporate governance deviance as a situation where firms intentionally 
deviate from standards set by legitimate practices and normative expectations advanced 
by the dominant national governance logic. There are several theoretical perspectives on 
deviance behaviour both at individual and organizational levels. Aguilera et al. (2018) 
build a theoretical corporate governance deviance perspective by drawing on the 
organizational deviance behaviour aspects and characterize the firm's governance 
deviance as an ecological phenomenon for the industry leaders (Joseph, et al., 2014). 
From the above discussion, we can assume that financial performance of industrial 
leaders in the US often demands deviance from standardised governance practices (Garg, 
2013; Aguilera et al., 2019) through introduction of  an innovative governance structure 
in response to societal and economic transformations, ensure corporate entrepreneurial 
identity and observe organisational ecology (Filatotchev et al., 2020; Aguilera et al., 
2018). Hence, we hypothesise:  
H1: The firms deviating from the corporate governance norms to demonstrate the 
entrepreneurial identity usually results in a better performance.  
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3. Research Design  
The purpose of this study is to explore the effects of corporate governance deviance on 
the performance of firms operating in the United States of America. Our Sample 
contains 2538 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange from the year 2000 to 2017. 
Our sample dataset is obtained from the Thomson Reuters Eikon and Thomson Assets-4 
database. The Thomson Reuters Assets-4 Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) 
database matrix is used to draw firm-level data on corporate governance (Harjoto, and 
Wang, 2020). Thomson ESG database constitutes of more than 178 data point collect on 
the individual firms based on their power of assessment and scoring on corporate 
governance, environmental, and corporate social responsibility. These 178 measures of a 
company's performance are grouped among ten categories which are classified as 
governance, social responsibility, and environment endeavours taken by the firms. 
Thomson Reuter Assets4 used publicly available sources to accumulate the value of 
these 178 indicators of more than 4000 firms around the globe to provide the investor 
with assessments on corporate. Based on the methodological foundation of Gomper et 
al. (2003) and Ferrero‐Ferrero et al. (2015) test, we have conceptualised the governance 
deviance index in this study by integrating all aspects of governance. Past studies on 
governance deviance provide a theoretical outlook (Aguilera et al., 2018). Therefore, 
this study is a pioneer to provide empirical evidence from the context of the United 
States of America and provide methodological rigour to extend and test the governance 
index of Gomper et al. (2003).         
The purpose of understanding the broader impact of our governance deviance Index, we 
gather two categories of financial variables. One is their internal or accounting-based, 
and the other is market-based financial measures of firms, e.g. Market to Book Value 
and Market Capitalisation.  
Table 1 presents a list of the variables. We have divided these variables into five groups: 
Right of Shareholders (RS_Val), Responsibility of Boards (RB_Val), Disclosure and 
Transparency (DT_Val), The Role of Stakeholder in Corporate Governance  
(ST_CG_VAL) and Equitable Treatment of Shareholder (EQU_TRE_VAL). 
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Insert table 1 here 
Rights of the Shareholder group include two variables measure designed to evaluate the 
governance aspect of the firm based on the rights of the shareholder as per the 
framework of the OECD principles defined and quantified by (Cheung et al., 2007). The 
Equitable Treatment of the shareholder contains two variables designed to measure the 
disclosure control structure among shareholders of the company. These classifications of 
variables were performed by matching the definition of the variables by measuring 
matrix as per the survey of the OECD scale created by the (Cheung et al., 2007).  
Governance deviance index is the sum of all the deviance score of the sub-indices 
(groups) created for five subgroups, i.e. Right of Shareholders (RS_Val), Responsibility 
of Boards (RB_Val), Disclosure and Transparency (DT_Val), The Role of Stakeholder 
in Corporate Governance (ST_CG_VAL) and Equitable Treatment of Shareholder 
(EQU_TRE_VAL). The Governance Deviance: GD-index values range from 1 to 16 and 
is the sum of sub-indices. 
We unveil the impact of corporate governance deviance practices on firm performance 
measured through Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q has been a popular measure of firm performance 
in corporate governance studies (Singh et al., 2018). We measure Tobin's Q by dividing 
the market value of assets by the book value of the assets. Our second model is adopted 
from Gomper et al. (2003) to look for the operational reason behind the deviance 
practices. We perform our principal analysis using the system Generalised Method of the 
Moment as the techniques for the previous resolving issues in literature and looking into 
the causation between the corporate governance deviance and firm valuation. Hence, we 
define corporate governance deviance and the firm’s performance measured in term of 
Tobin's-Q is deployed as follow: 
𝑄𝑖 = ∝+ 𝛽𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖+𝛽𝑖 ×𝑖 + ∈𝑖 
Our dynamic GMM model for the firms operating performance represented by sales 
growth, return on assets, and net operating margin is as follow: 
𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 = ∝+   𝜷𝟏GDevit+  𝜷𝟐Control𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  + ∈𝑖𝑡 
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4. Results  
Descriptive statistics for GDev-Index and the sub-indices for 2015, 2016, and 2017 are 
presented in Table 2. Table 2 also shows the distribution of GDev-Index according to 
years and also broken up into a portfolio based upon the tendency of deviance based on 
three "percentiles." These three percentiles-based divisions are similar but unbalanced in 
terms of firm size. However, size distribution in P0.3333 portfolio remains relatively 
stable in contradiction to P0.6667 portfolio from 2015 to 2017.  
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 3 provides the top five largest market capitalisation firms in the G ≤ P0.3333 and G 
≤ P0.6667 portfolio in 2015. Both Portfolios contain mobile, communication, and mortar 
companies in their top five most significant firms in terms of market capitalisation as 
well. Table 3 identifies two companies, Exxon Mobil Corp and General Electric Co., as 
our minimum deviant firm in 2015 which are found to adopt the deviant practice in the 
on-going years as deviance score of 1 in 2015 has raised to 2 in 2016 and seven scores in 
2017. For General Electric Co while three scores in 2015 have reached to 5 scores in 
2016 and 2017 for Exxon Mobil Crop, suggesting motivation of a firm to adopt a higher 
degree of governance deviation.  
Insert Table 3 
Table 4 provides the summary statistics and correlation of GDev-Index with several firm 
characteristics, such as return on assets, market capitalisation, and book value per share, 
shares outstanding, earning per share, market to book value, gross profit margin, 
operating profit margin, and debt to equity, etc.  
Insert Table 4 here 
Table 5 depicts the correlation between pairs of sub-indices; right of shareholders, 
disclosure, and transparency; the role of stakeholders in corporate governance and 
equitable treatment of shareholders, all have a positive and significant pairwise 
correlation with each other.   
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Insert Table 5 here 
There is also an existence of multicollinearity between the Disclosure and Transparency 
and Equitable Treatment of Shareholder (ρX,Y = 0.965; p<0.01, collinearity). Such 
collinearity exists because of the nature of principle motivation behind the Disclosure 
and Transparency will force the firms to have Equitable Treatment of Shareholder 
incorporated in their governance mechanism. However, the presence of this 
multicollinearity can affect the study of firm performance and sub-indices using OLS 
regression analysis. However, we do not treat for multicollinearity as our analysis do not 
employ OLS linear regression analysis; instead, we rely on the Generalised Method of 
Moment. Table 6 shows the result on the impact of corporate governance deviance on 
firm performance by controlling for endogeneity and specifying the dynamic relational 
model. 
Insert Table 6 here  
The Tobin's Q is regressed against our corporate governance deviance index 
independently in the model (1) and also with each control variable add one by one 
respectively in the model (2), (3), and (4). Our result depicts the presence of positive and 
significant relation between the corporate governance deviance and firm performance. 
Causation between the firm size (log of total assets), market capitali sation (in the log) 
and book Value of Share (in Log) has an insignificant but positive relationship with the 
firm performance except in the case of a firm size where our model (3) and (4) shows 
that firm size is insignificant but also negatively impacts on Tobin's Q. 
Our result shows the presences of the bias that can arise if we do not control for 
endogeneity. Our finding is somewhat similar and supports the notion that the firm 
adopts the corporate governance deviance practices in response to their target firm 
characteristics in our case (Wolfe and Sauaia, 2014) financial investment performance as 
measured by Tobin' s-Q. 
Table-7 presents the result regarding the relationship of firm value with five sub-indices 
and all control variables. Result in that role of stakeholder (β=4.63; p<0.05) and 
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responsibility of the board (β=1.27; p<0.05) have a positive and significant effect on the 
Tobin' s-Q. A firm that goes beyond the regulator and institutional norm in the term of 
the realisation of the responsibilities of the board and in defining the role of stakeholders 
in their corporate strategic decisions experience an increase in their investment 
performance. However, our model found an insignificant effect of deviance in terms of 
rights of shareholders (β=1.13; NS), disclosure and transparency (β=-2.23; NS), and 
equitable treatment (β=-1.71; N.S.). Surprisingly, deviance in; equitable treatment and 
disclosure and transparency have a negative but insignificant relation with firm 
performance. However, Table-7 somewhat presents a consistent inference about the 
adoption of deviance practices, as mentioned above. We can say that deviance in term of 
responsibilities of the board and the role of stakeholder in the strategic decision have 
significant effects on firm investment, motivates partly because of government 
regulations.  
Insert Table 7 here 
Robustness Tests 
In our model, we use return on assets measure as operating income divided by the total 
assets as the measure of the operating capability of a firm. To ensure greater robustness 
in our model, we also use a sales growth rate of the firm and net operating margin 
measure as operating income divided by sales as the indicator of firm operating ability.  
 For reliable results, the choice of instrumental variables is vital in our model. As 
mention in the above-stated assumptions, and the scholarly work of Core et al. (2006) 
found that there is a correlation between firm size with shareholder rights and firm 
profitability. Similarly, to control for the presence of cross-sectional difference among 
the firms, we also controlled for the book value of shares and market capitalisation in 
our model. Our dynamic GMM model for the firms operating performance represented 
by sales growth, return on assets, and net operating margin is as follow: 
𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 = ∝+   𝜷𝟏GDevit+  𝜷𝟐Control𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  + ∈𝑖𝑡 
Table-8 presents the relation between corporate governance deviance and firm operating 
performance. Model (1) results show that there exists a significant negative relationship 
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between the firm that deviates from market defined corporate policies and their returns 
on assets. Given that our result is somewhat consistent with the notion of Gomper et al. 
(2003), the nature of corporate bylaws, charter, and provision defined are aimed at 
depicting the strength of governance as a solution to agency problems among the 
investor and management. If so model (1) suggest that firm that deviates from these 
provision faces a negative return on their assets (β=-0.58; p<0.01). 
Insert Table 8 here 
Model (2) shows a statistically weak significance but positive relationship between the 
governance deviance and net operating profit margin (β=847.27; p<0.1). The results in 
the model (2) are similar to the notion presented by Akbar et al. (2016) that companies 
define their optimal level of compliance with the code of governance in response to their 
firm’s operating performance objectivity. Also, in our model (3) sales growth shows a 
negative and statistically insignificant relation with governance deviance (β=-
0.03;p<0.1).  
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Organisational adoption of deviant behaviour leads to the creation of the entrepreneurial 
orientation that leads to enhanced financial performance. We expand the findings of 
Miller and Le Breton–Miller (2011) and Gomper et al. (2003) by presenting an 
association between corporate governance deviance and performance. Although after 
empirically analysing the proposed hypothesis H1, we found that firm who are more 
aware of defining the practices that may not wholly comply with the spirit of the 
regulation is observed to have experienced enhanced firm performance measured in term 
of Tobin's Q. Our results supplement the findings of Garg (2013), Gomper et al. (2003) 
and the theory regarding entrepreneurial identify of the firm of Aguilera et al. (2018, 
2019). We also support the propositions of organisation theory and conclude that 
corporate governance setting has an impact on the firm financial performance. Our result 
supports the contemporary literature (Filatotchev et al., 2020) that firms who deviate 
corporate governance practices are found to experience a 1.5% increase in their financial 
performance.   
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The findings of our study are essential for the researchers, policymakers and board 
members of corporations at large. Efforts to enhance and evolve corporate governance, 
one shall focus on new dimensions and innovative governance practices that may result 
from the organisation ability to look for alternative governance choices. It will allow the 
practitioner to have in place an alternative entrepreneurial governance mechanism that 
facilitates them in pursuing the firm growth, entrepreneur and stakeholder objectives.  
Our research also lacks the study of the industrial impact that firms faced in their 
specific business sector. Resource-Based View of the organisation has shed the 
importance of the industrial sector the organisation belongs. Research on the impact of 
the acquisition of the organisation has been the subject of further study (Li et al., 2020). 
Their research tests the influence of industry, business-specific, and corporate parent 
influence on the profitability of the organisation. Their relative effect of these influences 
under the doctrine of corporate governance deviance is not performed to undergo the 
Meso-level analysis of the governance deviance concept and hence limits the scope of 
this study and model proposed. Such limitation severely impacts the adoption of the 
model as the explanatory factor of a practical scenario. We contribute to governance and 
management control research by sharing new insight and pioneer empirical work on the 
impact of governance deviance on financial performance. Future research could focus on 
governance deviance decisions (Augraila et al., 2019) of small firms and the importance 
of board as a management control function to improve the governance of family-owned 
firms (Saleem et al., 2019; Saleem et al., 2020) to study innovative governance 
mechanisms by engaging interdisciplinary governance perspectives (Filatotchev et al., 
2020). Scholars can also test the hybrid of self-regulation and state-regulation for better 
governance control (Saleem et al., in press), the role of sustainability in the service 
sector of emerging markets (Sajjad, et al., 2018) and  understand the role of ethical 
climate to  spark deviant workplace behaviours (Appelbaum, et al. 2005) 
Our findings have several implications for theoretical and policy perspective. We 
provided empirical evidence of corporate governance deviant behaviour to reflect 
entrepreneurial identity. We explored the resource-based framework to develop a 
theoretical foundation of deviant governance behaviour. We presented a multi-
dimensional view of governance deviance through governance deviance index. As such, 
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we recommend greater involvement of shareholder in governance standard adoption. The 
board also needs to be more vigilant in deciding an innovative governance practice 
which may deviate from dominant governance logic of industry.                
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Table 1:  Corporate Governance Variables 
  Percentage of Firm 
with Deviance in   
  Symbol 2015 2016 2017 
Rights of Shareholder     
Compensation Committee CC 1.8 2.1 2.4 
Nomination Committee NC 9.6 12.8 13.3 
Equitable Treatment of Shareholder     
Insider Dealings Controversies SL_IDC 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Policy Equal Voting Right SRP_EquVot 5.2 7.2 7.8 
Role of Stakeholder     
Succession Plan for Executives SuccPlan 2.8 5.9 6.8 
Board Diversity BS_BGD 9.9 17.8 18.8 
Disclosure and Transparency     
Staggered Board Structure SBS 5.2 7.2 7.8 
Classified Board Structure CBS 0.0 0.1 0.7 
Responsibility of the Board     
Audit Committee Independence ACI 45.2 22.7 19.1 
Chairman is ex-CEO Chai_Ex-
CEO 
76.9 63.2 57.3 
Compensation Committee Independence CCI 47.6 27.2 24.5 
Compensation Committee Non-Executive 
Member 
CC_NonExec 55.1 35.3 33.5 
Nomination Committee Independence NCI 50.9 37.0 33.8 
Nomination Committee Non-Executive 
Member 
NC_NonExec 62.4 45.7 43.7 
Strictly Independent Board Members BS_SIBM 79.8 71.4 70.3 
Non-Executive Board Members BS_NonExec 0.4 1.0 1.3 
This table shows the percentage of firms within each governance measure for the period of 2015 to 
2017. Thomson Reuters Asset4 is used to draw this data set. See Appendix 1 for the description of 
each governance measure as per the Thomson Reuters ESG matrix. The sample consists of all firms 












Table 2: Corporate Governance Index 
    2015 2016 2017 
     
Governance Deviance Index     
Mean  4.53 3.57 3.41 
Median  5 3 3 
Standard Deviation  2.47 2.22 2.18 
Minimum  0 0 0 
Maximum  13 11 12 
     
No. of Firms     
G ≤ P0.3333   1037 1056 1077 
G ≥ P0.6667  1088 1108 1039 
     
Sub-indices Means     
Right of Shareholder  0.11 0.15 0.16 
Equitable Treatment  0.05 0.07 0.08 
Role of Stakeholder  0.13 0.24 0.26 
Disclosure and Transparency  0.05 0.07 0.08 
Responsibility of  the Board   4.18 3.03 2.83 
This table provides summary statistics on the distribution of GDev-Index, the corporate governance deviance 
index, and sub-indices (rights of a shareholder, the equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders, 
disclosure and transparency, and responsibility of board) over time. Sub-indices are computed from the 
variables listed in table I and described in appendix I. we have divided the sample in the third percentile based 
















Table 3: Largest Firm in Extreme Portfolio 
G ≤ P0.3333 Portfolio 









AMAZON.COM INC 2 2 2 
APPLE INC 1 0 1 
EXXON MOBIL CORP 3 5 5 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 1 2 7 
MICROSOFT CORP 1 0 0 
 
G ≥ P0.6667 Portfolio 









ALIBABA GROUP 7 7 7 
FACEBOOK INC 7 7 7 
MERCADOLIBRE INC 7 1 7 
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS 7 7 7 
X5 RETAIL GROUP N.V. 8 7 7 
The table presents the firm with the largest market capitalization at the end of 2015 of 
companies in our extreme portfolio, i.e., G ≥ P0.6667 & G ≤ P0.3333. The calculation of G 
discussed in the governance deviance index section. One means minimum deviance, eight means 





















Mean G ≤ 
P0.3333 
Portfolio 




Return on Assets -0.09*** 2.02 -3.39 5.41*** 
    (0.00) 
Market Capitalization -0.06*** 13,848,424 8,402,024 5,446,400*** 
    (0.00) 
Book Value per Share 0.00 21.48 21.44 0.04 
    (0.98) 
Outstanding Share -0.07*** 226,757 156,468 70,289*** 
    (0.00) 
Earnings Per Share -0.00 1.87 -.68 2.55 
    (0.07) 
Market to Book Value -0.01 2.96 2.84 0.12 
    (0.84) 
Gross Profit Margin -0.02 35.68 28.80 6.88 
    (0.26) 
Operating Profit Margin -0.01 -462.05 -646.56 184.51 
    (0.46) 
Debt to Equity -0.01 101.08 87.90 13.18 
    (0.62) 
Share Price 0.02 57.41 288.63 -231.22 
    (0.09) 
Sales -0.03** 7,209,864 5,162,344 2047520** 
    (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure -0.02 427,658 361,347 66311 
    (0.21) 
Total Assets -0.05*** 23,168,844 12,032,201 11,136,643*** 
    (0.00) 
Tobin’s-Q 0.02 1.62 13.11 -11.49 
    (0.08) 
Sales Growth 0.01 .54 .62 -0.08 
     (0.84) 
="* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001" 
The table presents the summary statistics of GDev-Index with several financial and accounting variables. First, Colum gives 
us the correlation of GDev-Index with each of the measures of financial and accounting of firms. Second and third columns 
give the means of the same variables within our extreme portfolio structures. The last column provides the statistical 








Table 5: Correlation Matrix of Sub-indices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Right of Shareholder 1     
Equityable Treatment 0.066* 1    
Role of Stakeholder 0.037* 0.118* 1   
Disclosure and 
Transparency 
0.068* 0.965* 0.129* 1  
Responsibility of Board 0.095* -0.054* -0.101* -0.053* 1 
This table shows the pairwise correlation among the sub-indices, right of shareholders, equitable treatment, the role of 
stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and responsibility of the board. The calculation of sub-indices shown 
mentioned in the data section of the paper moreover, the constituents of the sub-indices are depicted in Table 1 and are 
described in Appendix I. * indicates significance at the .01 level.  
 
Table 6: Firm performance and Corporate Governance Deviance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
GDev-Index-Index 2.71** 1.59** 1.40*** 1.50** 
 (1.25) (0.69) (0.37) (0.69) 
Firm Size  1.51 -0.16 -2.98 
  (1.25) (1.84) (6.28) 
Log Book Value of Share   0.65 1.09 
   (2.04) (4.43) 
Market Capitalization    2.77 
    (4.56) 
Constant -5.80 -22.34 -0.73 -1.04 
 (4.25) (18.31) (20.69) (25.65) 
     
Durbin chi2    0.009 
Wu-Hausman F(1,6884)    0.009 
Sargan Overidentification    0.724 
Basmann Overidentification    0.725 
Observations 7,607 7,607 7,133 7,133 
No. of companies 2,536 2,536 2,461 2,461 
The result in the table are Generalized Method of Moment estimates for four different specifications 
for Panel of 2532 firms; the model is Q i = a + B(GDev-Index) + BXi + ɛi. The dependent variable is 
Tobin’s-Q; GDev-Index is the governance deviance index. The control variable is Firm Size (log of 
Assets), Book Value of Share (Log BV) and Market Capitalization (log mrkcap). Two instrumental 
variables in the model are also used to cater for the endogeneity, i.e., Capital expenditure and Debt to 
equity ratio, between the corporate governance deviance and Tobin's -Q, i.e., Capital Expenditure and 
leverage. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table also depicts the results of Test of Enodgeneity 
(i.e., Durbin and WU-Husman) and Instrument validity (i.e., Sargan test and Basmann )  






Table 7: Firm performance and Corporate Governance Deviance Sub-indices 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Rights of Shareholder 1.13     
 (3.11)     
Equitable Treatment  -1.71    
  (6.48)    
Role of Stakeholder   4.63**   
   (1.89)   
Disclosure and Transparency    -2.23  
    (6.39)  
Responsibility of Boards     1.27** 
     (0.56) 
Firm Size -1.54 0.25 -5.98 0.30 -2.87 
 (2.84) (2.71) (5.16) (2.41) (11.68) 
Book value of Share -0.65 0.24 1.34 0.57 0.24 
 (1.88) (3.78) (1.66) (4.16) (7.36) 
Market Capitalization 3.28 -1.20 9.37** -1.71 3.53 
 (2.81) (7.62) (4.54) (7.58) (8.14) 
Constant -21.77 16.41 -52.07*** 22.67 -10.56 
  (31.54) (71.62) (20.05) (77.95) (36.41) 
The result in the table is Dynamic Generalized Method of Moment estimates for firm performance and sub -indices of 
corporate governance deviance based on OECD principal. the model is Q i = a + B(GDev-Index) + BXi + ɛi. The 
dependent variable is Tobin’s-Q; GDev-Index is the governance deviance index. The control variable is Firm Size (log 
of Assets), Book Value of Share (Log BV), and Market Capitalization (log mrkcap). Two instrumental variables in the 
model are also used to cater for the endogeneity, i.e., is  capital expenditure and debt to equity ratio, between the 
corporate governance deviance and Tobin's-Q, i.e., Capital Expenditure and leverage. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1















Table 8: Corporate Governance Deviance and Firms Operating performance 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 ROA OPM Sale Growth 
     
GDev-Index -0.58*** 847.27* -0.03 
 (0.12) (486.91) (0.17) 
Firm Size -2.30*** -220.03 2.46*** 
 (0.50) (1,965.14) (0.90) 
Book Value of Share 3.32*** -12.32 0.47 
 (0.40) (1,569.69) (0.56) 
Market Capitalization 1.03*** -1,120.67 0.58 
 (0.31) (1,212.10) (0.43) 
    
Durbin chi2 0.000 0.054 0.010 
Wu-Hausman F(1,6884) 0.000 0.054 0.010 
Observations 4,652 4,652 4,463 
Number of com 2,364 2,364 2,285 
This table presents the result of The Generalized Method Of Moment regression for gross profit margin, 
return on assets, and sales growth on Governance Deviance Index GDev-Index. First regression shows the 
results of GDev-Index with return on assets. Second regression shows the effects Operating profit margin 
with the regressor GDev-Index. Moreover, the third column shows the result of the implication of one-
year sales growth due to GDev-Index. In all model, the controlling variables are the size of the firm, i.e., a 
log of total assets of the firm., log of market capitalisation and a book value of the share. Significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% is shown as ***, ** and * respectively. The standard error of each variable is shown 
below in parenthesis. The table also depicts the results of Test of Enodgeneity (i.e., Durbin and WU -
Husman) and Instrument validity (i.e. Sargan test and Basmann )  
 
